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TAX SAVING IDEA FOR THE CLOSE CORPORATION
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what other-
wise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which
the law permits, cannot be doubted.'
In the spirit of the above statement by Justice Sutherland, American
corporations have consistently sought to reduce their income taxes by
(among other means) increasing business expense deductions allow-
able under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 [hereinafter IRC] In
pursuit of this end, they have often sought to minimize non-deductible
dividends to shareholders through the maximum utilization of legally
deductible disguised dividends,3 thereby reducing taxable income and
circumventing the double taxation characteristic of the corporate dis-
tribution to shareholders. 4 This form of "tax planning" is possible
since, according to the regulations, dividend treatment is not applicable
"to an amount paid by a corporation to a shareholder unless the amount
is paid to the shareholder in his capacity as such."5 Thus, any dis-
tribution to a shareholder which can be successfully disbursed as a
payment to an employee or a creditor will be deductible as a business
expense by the corporation; and while the shareholder must still in-
clude the amount in his personal income, the double-taxation treatment
accorded dividends is circumvented. Logically, disguised dividend
situations arise much more frequently in connection with close corpora-
tions than with large, publicly-held corporations, since the shareholders
of a close corporation are much more likely to be corporate employees
or creditors than are the shareholders of a large corporation.
Among the dividend disguises which have been utilized by corpora-
l Gregory v. Helvering, 283 U.S. 465, 469 (1934).
2 INT. RnEV. CODE of 1954, § 162 [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.] states in relevant
part:(a) In general-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on a trade or business, including-(1) a reasonable allow-
ance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered....
8 Within the scope of this comment, the term "disguised dividend" is used
to designate corporate distributions to shareholders which, under I.R.C. § 162, are
legally deductible by the corporation as business expenses. In no way is the
term "disguised dividend" meant to connote any scheme or deduction which is
illegal or tax evasive. For a general discussion of these and other methods to avoid
double taxation of corporate distributions to shareholders, see Comment, Disguised
Dividends: A Comprehensive Survey, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REY. 207 (1956).
a basic discussion of the "double taxation" problem, see B. BrrInm &
L. STON , FEDE INCOME ESTATE AND GIFr TAX-(.ATION 620-29 (4th ed. 1972).5 Treas. Reg. § 1.301-I(c) (1955).
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tions are salaries,6 commissions,7 bonuses,3 payments for goodwill,9
rents,' 0 royalties," and director's fees.' 2 In addition to these, a recent
decision by the United States District Court, Northern District of
Texas, has added a new element to the corporate repertoire-the guar-
antor's fee for shareholder-guarantors. It is this new disguise which
shall be afforded specific consideration herein.
In Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States,13 the stockholders of a cattle
feedlot corporation collectively guaranteed a 1.8 million dollar loan
to the corporation, with each shareholder personally guaranteeing an
amount proportionate to his percentage of ownership of the stock of
the corporation. In return, the corporation agreed to pay the share-
holder-guarantors an annual fee of 3% of the amount personally guar-
anteed. This arrangement necessarily made the fee payments a pro
rata distribution to the corporation's shareholders. This pro rata factor
was a "red flag" to the Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter IRS],
which disallowed the corporation's deduction of the fee as a business
expense, claiming that the fee arrangement was merely an elaborate
and unacceptable plan to avoid the double taxation of dividends to
shareholders. However, the district court held that while the pro
rata distribution was prima facie evidence of a dividend, the corpora-
dion's proof that the fees were "ordinary", "necessary", and "reasonable"
expenses pursuant to a business purpose qualified the fees as a
legitimately deductible business expense, presumably under the "other
compensation for personal services"' 4 language of Section 162 of the
0 See Lilime v. Reinecke, 59 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1932); but see Duffey v.
Lethert, 11 Am. FED. TAx R.2d 1317 (D. Minn. 1963); Doughboy Industries, Inc.
v. United States, 4 Am. FED. TAx R.2d 5021 (W.D. Wis. 1959); Chesapeake Mfg.
Co., 33 P-H TAx CT. Mamn. ff 64,214 (1964), aff'd mem., 347 F.2d 507 (4th Cir.
1965).
7 See Royal Cotton Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 761 (1958); but see
United Tailors and Cleaners Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 172 (1928).8 See Skyland Oldsmobile, Inc., 41 P-H TAx CT. MEm. ff 72,017 (1972); but
see W. C. Hudlow, Jr., 40 P-H TAx CT. MEM. I9 71,218 (1972); Juneau Dairies,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 759 (1941).
9 See William E. Lamble, 86 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 1f 67,185 (1967); but see
Sidney LeVine v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 147 (1955).
'0 See General Film Corp., 274 F. 903 (2d Cir. 1921); but see Armston v.
Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951), aff'g 12 T.C. 539 (1949); Limericks,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1948), affg 7 T.C. 1129 (1946).
11 See Nelson v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1953), rev'g 21 P-H TAx
CT. Mans. fI 52,006 (1952); but see Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d
569 (7th Cir. 1949), affg 10 T.C. 1199 (1948); Peterson & Pegau Baking Co., 2
B.T.A. 637 (1925).
12 See First Nat'l Bank, 19 P-H TAx CT. MEAn. IT 50,051 (1950); Astorian-
Budget Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 969 (1941); but see Outlet
Clothing Co., 14 P-H TAx CT. MEn. ff 45,358 (1945).
366 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
14 I.RC. § 162(a)(1).
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Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This novel scheme, sanctioned by the
decision in Tulia, has great potential in the field of tax planning for the
close corporation and is available for use in any situation which fulfills
the specific requirements of IRC § 162.
Is Tim FEE "ORDwNRY"?
The first specific requirement for deductibility of shareholder-
guarantor's fees as business expenses is that the fees be "ordinary"
within the meaning of IRC § 162. In different contexts, the term
"ordinary" has been, and is, subject to different interpretations, but with
respect to IRC § 162 the interpretive guideline for the use of the term
has long been established and accepted. In Welch v. Helvering,15 the
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Cardozo, stated that "'ordi-
nary' in this context [IRC] 16 does not mean that the payments must be
habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to
make them often,"17 but rather that the expenses be ordinary in the
sense that it is known "from experience that payments for such a pur-
pose . . . are common and accepted"'18 occurrences in that particular
field of business. At present, the reported incidents of fee payments
to shareholders in return for services rendered as loan guarantors are
not numerous enough to justify the claim that it is known "from ex-
perience that payments for such a purpose . . . are common and ac-
cepted",19 yet the court in Tulia, without discussion, found the fee
payments to be ordinary, perhaps indicating that such payments to
shareholder-guarantors will henceforth be judicially accepted as ordi-
nary once the further requirements of "necessary" and "reasonable"
are fulfilled. In effect, the court seems to be saying, "You have satisfied
us as to the necessity and reasonableness of the fees. Therefore we will
not rule against you simply because your idea is novel and cannot be
supported by volumes of cases in which the same idea has been suc-
cessfully utilized. Far be it from this court to penalize ingenuity." If
the decision in Tulia is accepted by the appellate courts20 and by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is very likely that numerous
other close corporations will follow the lead of Tulia Feedlot, Inc.
and that in a very few years such shareholder-guarantor's fees will
'5 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
16 The actual statutes being considered were the Revenue Act of 1926 and'
the Revenue Act of 1928. These acts contained sections similar to I.R.C. § 162.
17 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
is Id.
19 Id.2 0 As of this writing there is no record of any direct appeal from the decision
of the district court or of any acquiesence in the decision by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue.
11 4 [Vol. 62.
indeed become "common and accepted", thus legitimately meeting the
Welch standard for "ordinary" business expenses.
WEN Is THE FEE "NEcEssAnY"?
The second requirement for deductibility of shareholder-guarantor's
fee expenses under IRC § 162 is that such expenses be "necessary" for
the production or collection of income. The presently operative defini-
tion of the term "necessary" as used in this context was also established
by the Supreme Court in Welch v. Helvering,2'1 wherein the Court
found that certain expenditures "were necessary for the development
of the petitioner's business, ... in the sense that they were appropriate
and helpful." 22 The Court later expanded this definition in Lilly v.
Commissioner,23 stating that certain payments fell within IRC § 162
since such payments were" "'necessary' in the generally accepted mean-
ing of that word. It was through making such payments that petitioners
had been able to establish their business."
24
Applying the above definition to the shareholder-guarantor's fee
situation, and using Tulia as a reference point, three conditions arise
upon which fulfillment of the "necessary" requirement of IRC § 162
seems to rest. First, the taxpayer must satisfy the court that the loans
guaranteed by the shareholders were indeed essential to the main-
tenance and development of the business. In Tulia, the court examined
the scope and history of the cattle feedlot business and concluded,
"[I]t is obvious that this type of business could not be successfully
carried on and enlarged by the plaintiff corporation without adequate
and heavy financing."25
Second, the court must be satisfied that these essential loans are
unavailable to the corporation unless they are personally guaranteed
by the shareholders. This prerequisite is easily fulfilled, due largely
to the simple financial reality that lending institutions require ade-
quate assurance of repayment before approving a loan. A bank will
always request the principal to endorse the note evidencing the debt;
sometimes the signature of the authorized corporate officer is all that
the bank will require. However, if the loan cannot be adequately
assured by the financial statement of the borrowing corporation alone,
a pledge of security may be required. In cases where the prospective
borrower does not have enough capital or security to provide satis-
21 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
22 Id. at 113.
23 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
24 Id. at 93.




factory assurance that the loan will be repaid, the corporation may be
required to obtain guarantors who will agree to accept personal
liability for the loan in the event the corporation should fail. Where a
close corporation procures a large loan, the lending institution will
usually insist upon such an arrangement,26 and often the required
guarantors will be selected from the shareholders of the corporation,
thus creating the shareholder-guarantor situation. In Tulia, the court
found that this "unavailability" condition was met by evidence which
established that "the bank would not have made any of the loans
involved unless ... guarantees were received by the bank insuring
individual liability on the part of the stockholder-directors."27
A third and final condition for fulfilling the "necessary" requirement
in the shareholder-guarantor's fee situation is that the corporate tax-
payer must be able to establish that the fee was demanded by the
shareholders in return for their services as guarantors, and that the
shareholders refused to provide such services unless the fee was
approved and disbursed. Such was the case in Tulia, where the court
found that the shareholders "would not have signed the.., guarantee
unless they received some remuneration. . . . Therefore, in order to
operate and expand its business in an efficient manner, the plaintiff
was required to pay the fee in this case."2s
WHAT FEE Is "REASoNABLE?
The final and most determinative requirement with which the
corporation must comply in order to assure deductibility of shareholder-
guarantor's fees as a business expense is that the fees must be "reason-
able" within the meaning of IRC § 162. The reasonableness require-
ment is, moreover, the most elusive and perplexing of the three criteria
established by that provision. In connection with the business expense
deduction (and with other areas of tax law ),29 the requirement of
reasonableness "defies tax experts in the same manner that the legen-
dary reasonable man escapes precise definition by negligence lawyers
and the concept of reasonable doubt remains a major challenging
factor in the criminal law."30 So frustrating is this concept that a
perplexed Supreme Court of Nebraska once wrote, "an attempt to
26 For a discussion of methods and problems of financing operations of a close
corporation, see W. CASEY, SuccEssFuL TECHNIQUES THAT MULTIPLY PROFITS AND
PEasoxAL PAYOFF IN THE CLOSELY HE.U CoRPORATioN 1100-79 (1973).27 Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 1089, 1091 (N.D. Tex.
1973).
2 Id. at 1091-92.
29 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 167(a), 611(a), 166(c), 537(a).
30 J. HOLDEN, REASONABLE COMPENSATION A-3 (BNA Tax Management Port-
folios No. 202-2d, 1971).
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give specific meaning to the word "reasonable' is trying to count what
is not number, and measure what is not space."
3 1
In spite of these difficulties, it is the task of the corporation, with
the help of its tax attorney, to determine with as much certainty as
possible what fee would constitute "reasonable" compensation for the
services of a shareholder as a loan guarantor. The Internal Revenue
Service has furnished some general guidelines in this area through the
promulgation of Treasury Regulation § 1.162-7(3)32 which provides
that it is
... just to assume that reasonable and ,true compensation is only
such amount as would ordinarily be paid for like services by like
enterprises under like circumstances. The circumstances to be
taken into consideration are those existing at the date when the
contract for services was made, not those existing at the date when
the contract is questioned.33
The circumstances referred to in this regulation 4 vary with the type
of compensation being considered (e.g., salaries, bonuses, or commis-
sions),a5 but with regard to the shareholder-guarantor's fee arrange-
ment introduced in Tulia, five factors seem to be determinative of the
outcome. These factors are:
1) The usual and customary fee for guaranteeing such loans.3 6 This
is not a reliable indicator at the present time since, as mentioned
above, the shareholder-guarantor's fee is a novel idea and little evi-
dence exists regarding usual and customary fees. This factor is listed,
however, in anticipation of future situations wherein precedent and
.custom will be available for consideration.
2) The risk involved. Regarding this factor, one should consider
a) the past loan and repayment record of the corporation, b) addi-
tional outstanding loans to the corporation, c) the duration of the loan
involved, and d) the future profit prospects for the corporation.
3) The nature of the operations of the corporation. This factor is
closely related to the risk element, although here one must consider
the general situation of the industry of which the corporation is a part.
In Tulia, for example, the court considered the "ups and downs"37 of
the cattle feedlot industry in making its decision as to reasonableness.
81 Altshuler v. Coburn, 57 N.W. 836, 838 (Neb. 1894).32 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(3) (1958).
33 Id.
34 Id.35 For a discussion of the factors to be considered in connection with salaries
and such conventional compensation methods, see J. HoLENm, supra note 80, at




4) The effect of the guarantee on the credit line and net worth
of the shareholder-guarantors. Probably the best justification for the
shareholder-guarantor's fee is that, in providing the loan guarantee,
the shareholders necessarily suffer an impairment of their personal
borrowing capacities and net worth, and a consequent reduction in
their ability to take advantage of additional financial opportunities.
To the extent of such financial impairment, they are deemed entitled
to adequate compensation.
5) The current interest rate being charged by banks for such loans.
While this factor, like the first, is not yet of primary importance, it is
listed in anticipation of future payments based on the success of the
scheme in Tulia. This variable, shaped by customary banking pro-
cedure and experience as well as by underlying economic forces,
reflects the interrelationship of all of the above factors. When the
interest rate charged on the loan in question is compared with the
rates charged by the bank on other shareholder-guaranteed loans, tax
attorneys, courts, and the IRS should be able to more easily and
exactly calculate a "reasonable" rate of compensation in the particular
situation.
Due to the number and nature of these determining factors, a
decision as to reasonableness necessarily turns on, and is limited to, the
particular circumstances presented in the case. For example, a decision
that X fee is reasonable in Y situation decides very little about other
situations in which X fee will be reasonable or about other fees which
will be reasonable in Y situation. This thesis was borne out by a Sup-
plemental Memorandum of Law"8 issued by the Tulia court after the
Internal Revenue Service asserted that the shareholders of Tulia Feed-
lot, Inc. could, by raising the amount of the fee (indeed the share-
holders had raised the fee from 3% in 1970 to 6% in 1971), remove all
of the profits from the corporation without according dividend treat-
ment to any part of such distributions. In reply, the court explicitly
pointed out that its decision in Tulia was limited to a 3% fee, and that
any other fee would be judged on its own merits when and if chal-
lenged by the IRS.
Due to this ad hoc method of determining reasonableness, earlier
cases are of dubious precedential value, and the corporate tax attorney
may never be entirely sure that his scheme will be free from attack
Nevertheless, challenges to the reasonableness of shareholder-guar-
antor's fees can largely be avoided by proper tax planning based on
the five factors listed above and on a study of contemporaneous com-




pensation decisions. As mentioned above, however, there are no con-
temporaneous decisions (except Tulia) dealing with shareholder-
guarantor's fees; therefore unless and until such a body of case law
develops, the attorney must find an alternate source of guidance. What
follows is an attempt to provide some basic direction in the utilization
of this newest form of disguised dividend, based upon cases in which
substantially similar payments were involved. The individual cases
may differ from the shareholder-guarantor's fee situation in one or
more aspects, including 1) the guarantor is not a shareholder, 2) the
fee is not an annual payment for the life of the loan, or 3) the fee is
not a pro-rata distribution to shareholders. In addition, some of the
cases were decided prior to the enactment of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954; however the statutes under which they were decided
contain substantially identical language to that of IRC § 162.39
In Guarantee Liquid Measure Co. v. Commissioner,4" a $25,000
payment to the corporation's president was allowed as reasonable
compensation for services in connection with negotiating the purchase
of the Marvel Equipment Company and for personally guaranteeing
the $250,000 loan necessary to make the purchase. This 10% fee must
be adjusted downward somewhat since it was a lump sum rather than
an annual payment and since it was to compensate for services not
only as a guarantor, but also as a negotiator.
Davis B. Thornton4' involved a shareholder's assignment of a life
insurance policy and thirty shares of A.T. & T. stock to a bank as col-
lateral for a $30,000 loan to the corporation. A fee of $1,281.45 (the
exact premium due on the insurance policy) was allowed as a business
expense deduction. This was a 4.3% lump sum payment.
In T. Jack Foster, "42 the sole shareholder and president of a develop-
ment company was paid $80,000 for services as guarantor of a
$5,000,000 loan. This 1.6% payment was held to be reasonable com-
pensation.
Perhaps all that can be gleaned from these few examples43 is a
very rudimentary feel for the reasonableness limitations imposed on
the shareholder-guarantor's annual fee by IRC § 162. Unfortunately,
39 See Revenue Act of 1936. ch. 690, § 23 (a), 49 Stat. 1658-59; Revenue Act
of 1924, ch. 234, § 234(a) (1), 43 Stat. 283.
40 20 B.T.A. 758 (1930).
41 14 P-H TAx CT. MEirO. 1 45,011 (1945).
4235 P-H TAx CT. MEM. ff 66,273 (1966).
43 See also Wiggin Terminals v. United States, 36 F.2d 893 (1st Cir. 1929);
In re Concord SilversmiAths Corp., 32 F. Supp. 128 (D.N.H. 1940); A.A. & E.B.
Jones Co., 29 P-H TAX CT. Man. ff 60,284 (1960); Monroe Sand & Gravel Co., 36
B.T.A. 747 (1937)- Moxa Bldg. Co., 31 B.T.A. 457 (1934), affd mem., 79 F.2d
1004 (2d Cir. 1935); Gillespie Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 926 (1928).
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such cases offer possibly the only positive -advance guidance available
to corporations wishing to utilize this form of disguised dividend, since
Revenue Procedure 72-944 provides that the IRS will not issue advance
rulings regarding the reasonableness of compensation under IRC §
162.45 Thus, until the shareholder-guarantor's fee becomes more widely
used and litigated, the attorney must rely heavily on his own judg-
ment and discretion in advising corporate clients as to the validity
and desirability of that arrangement.
CONCLUSION
In spite of the uncertainties and risks involved, planning possibilities
abound in connection with the shareholder-guarantor's fee. The use
of this fee can relieve some of the problems presently associated with
drawing profits out of the close corporation through the use of "reason-
able" salaries, bonuses, and the like, since it can be utilized instead of
or in addition to such payments. Through the chary use of this in-
novation, in careful combination with other accepted business expense
deductions, the close corporation and. its shareholders can achieve
maximum flow-through of corporate profits. Clearly, the attractiveness
as well as the legality of such a scheme, as Justice Sutherland stated,
"cannot be doubted."46
John E. Heer, III
44 Rev. Proc. 72-9, 1972-1 CuM. BuLL. 719.
45 However, an advance ruling as to whether a fee is "ordinary and neces-
sary" may be obtained in proper circumstances. For a summary of when advance
opinion may be sought from the I.R.S., see How to Get an "Advance Look" at the
Tax Consequences of Corporate Maneuvers, CLOSELY HELD COR ROATION IDEAS
1-2 (Dec. 1973).
46 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1934).
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